Kim Jong-un makes no mention of inter-Korean relations in 2020 vision

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un presides over the 5th Plenary Session of the 7th Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee on Dec. 31. (KCNA)

Omission may reflect Pyongyang’s disappointment in Seoul’s role in denuclearization negotiations

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un presides over the 5th Plenary Session of the 7th Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee on Dec. 31. (KCNA)

No message to South Korea was to be found in North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s “vision” for the new year.

The term “inter-Korean relations” did not appear even once in an 18,000-character report on the outcome of the 5th Plenary Session of the 7th Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee on Dec. 31, which was published in the Jan. 1 edition of the Rodong Sinmun newspaper. This stood in sharp contrast with the Kim’s 2019 New Year’s address, which referred to inter-Korean relations 10 times and expressed his willingness to “resume the Kaesong Industrial Park and Mt. Kumgang tourism without any precondition.”

In connection with this, the South Korean Ministry of Unification said that “inter-Korean relations are not typically dealt with during the party’s plenary sessions.” While New Year’s addresses make reference to all areas of governance, WPK plenary sessions tend to focus on key issues in the political situation.

The “omission” of any reference to inter-Korean relations has its positive and negative aspects. To begin with, a former senior official said it suggested that inter-Korean relations were “not an important variable” at a plenary session convened by Kim to identify solutions on the political front -- an apparent reflection of South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s diminishing stature in the wake of the North Korea-US summit in Hanoi in February 2019 and Pyongyang’s disappointment with the role Seoul has played.

Other observers stressed the need to focus on the positive side and the remaining “window of opportunity,” noting that Kim’s reference to the US as “brigandish” suggests he would also have been compelled to express a rigid stance on inter-Korean relations if he had mentioned them. According to this analysis, the fact that Kim did not proclaim any “code of guidelines” on inter-Korean relations hints at some potential for inter-Korean relations to improve, depending on what moves Seoul makes.

S. Korea, US likely to maintain the adjusted format of joint exercises

The first watershed for the Korean Peninsula political situation this year appears likely to be the question of whether South Korea and the US go ahead with their joint military exercises scheduled for around March. In a statement credited to a Ministry of Unification spokesperson, the South Korean government said it “lauds the fact that North Korea did not declare the suspension of its dialogue with the US today.”

“Both South Korea and the US confirmed that they have been essentially refraining from large-scale military exercises while dialogue has been going on,” the statement noted.

The statement also said the South Korean government would “continue working to achieve progress in inter-Korean relations along with substantive progress in the North Korea-US denuclearization negotiations” and pledged to “thoroughly implement agreement terms to build military trust between South and North.”

South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ahead of their Panmunjom summit on May 26, 2018. (provided by the Blue House)

Last year, South Korea and the US discontinued three major sets of joint exercises -- Key Resolve, Foal Eagle, and Ulchi-Freedom Guardian -- and conducted joint exercises only at the squadron level or lower. The two sides also appear likely to maintain the adjusted format of joint exercises this year as long as the climate remains favorable in terms of denuclearization dialogue. But a full-scale postponement or suspension of joint exercises is an awkward proposition for the South Korean government, which needs to speed up efforts toward a return of wartime operational control (OPCON). South Korea and the US are planning to assess the South Korean military’s full operational capability (FOC) this year for the sake of the OPCON transfer, with the assessment reportedly to be conducted in conjunction with joint exercises in the second half of the year.

“At present, there has been no change in terms of joint exercises proceeding under their adjusted format this year,” a South Korean Ministry of National Defense official said.

“If we do not go ahead with the exercises, it could create setbacks for the OPCON transfer,” the official added.

The South Korean government has referred to the “necessity” of a resolution submitted by China and Russia to the UN Secretary Council to call for the loosening of North Korea sanctions, while reviewing ideas for achieving progress in inter-Korean relations through railway and road linkages and other efforts. But the mounting barriers to North Korea-US negotiations have resulted in growing concerns.

“Under the current circumstances, the key thing is maintaining the momentum for North Korea-US dialogue,” a South Korean government official said.

“Depending on the situation, progress in inter-Korean relations may need to be a half-step ahead of North Korea-US relations, but there will need to be progress in North Korea-US dialogue for things like the railway and road linkages and sanctions relief to move forward,” the official explained.

By Park Min-hee, staff reporter, and Yoo Kang-moon and Lee Je-hun, senior staff writers

Please direct comments or questions to [[e-mail]]